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The Governance of Hybrid Organizations 
Chris Cornforth and Roger Spear 
 
(Pre-publication version of a chapter in Billis, D. (2010) (ed.) Hybrid Organizations 
in the Third Sector: Challenges of Practice, Policy and Theory, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave.) 
 
 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is on the governance of third sector organizations 
(TSOs) and the challenges that are raised by hybridity. In particular it will 
focus on the question how does hybridity affect governance structures and 
processes and the challenges that governing bodies face? 
 
A number of factors are driving the growth of new hybrid forms of 
organizations in the third sector. Government policy has increasingly sought 
to create a mixed economy of welfare, by encouraging both private and third 
sector organizations to engage in public service delivery. Indeed government 
has invested heavily in capacity building and infra-structure in the sector to 
help make TSOs better able to take on this new role. At the same time many 
TSOs have been looking to diversify their income streams, and have seen 
trading as an important way to do this. Figures from the Voluntary Sector 
Almanac in 2006 showed earned income of voluntary organizations growing 
from 33% in 1994/5 to 47% in 2003/4, to become the largest single source of 
income (Wilding et al, 2006) and in 2005/6 the earned income of general 
charities rose to over 50% for the first time (Reichart et al, 2008).  
 
Alongside this growth in commercial activity, there has also been a growth in 
TSOs that identify themselves as social enterprises, these are hybrid 
businesses that trade in the market but pursue social or environmental goals 
(Nyssens, 2006). Some of this growth has been stimulated by top-down 
government policies, such as the encouragement of social enterprises in the 
areas of health and social care (Walsham, et al, 2007). Others have come out 
of grass-roots initiatives, such as the movement for fair-trade. Responding to 
these developments the government has created a new legal form, the 
community interest company (CIC), which was designed to meet the needs of 
some forms of social enterprise, and a new regulator for CICs. 
 
Government has also increasingly sought to create new partnerships at a 
local level between organizations in the public, third and private sectors to 
tackle social problems and deliver joined-up services. Taken together these 
changes are leading to an ever more complex and varied organizational 
landscape in the third sector. At the inter-organizational level there is a growth 
of partnerships, federations, collaborations and alliances. At the 
organizational level many organizations are adopting more complex structures 
with, for example, one or more trading subsidiaries. Organizations may also 
adopt a variety of legal forms and are subject to different regulatory regimes. 
All of which have implications for organizational governance. 
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Unfortunately research on the governance of TSOs has not kept up with this 
growing complexity. A preponderance of research has taken place in North 
America and has often focussed on the boards of medium- and large-sized 
non-profit agencies that work in the field of human services (Ostrower and 
Stone, 2006). It has tended to ignore other aspects of the governance system 
such as membership, audit or regulatory requirements, or how other wider 
contextual factors influence governance. The focus has also been primarily on 
unitary organizations with single boards, rather than the more complex 
governance structures that many hybrid organizations adopt, such as charities 
with trading subsidiaries. Little attention has been paid to how partnerships 
between organizations in different sectors are governed, or the impact of 
partnership working and receiving government contracts is having on 
governance practices at the organizational level. 
 
This chapter starts to address this gap by exploring some of the implications 
of hybridity for organizational governance. It begins quite broadly by focusing 
on the different types of governance structures employed within TSOs. It 
suggests that the governance of TSOs varies quite widely from the ideal type 
of the membership association outlined in Chapter 2. Three broad types of 
governance structure are identified and their potential strengths and 
weaknesses are discussed, particularly in terms of accountability. It also 
explores the different governance challenges of organizations with few or no 
staff compared to those with an established professional staff structure (that 
Billis in chapter 2 calls entrenched hybrids).  
 
The chapter then goes on to examine governance in particular types of hybrid 
organization. However, the diversity and complexity of the sector means that 
not all types of hybrid can be examined. Hence a selective approach has 
been taken. First, it will examine trading charities as an important example of 
third/private sector hybrids. It notes that one of the main ways of coping with 
the potentially different requirements of charitable and trading activities is by 
separating or ‘decoupling’ them from each other. Secondly, it will examine 
public/third sector hybrids that are created when services are ‘spun-out ‘of the 
public sector, for example leisure trusts that have taken over the leisure and 
recreations services of local authorities. 
  
However, before looking at these different examples it is important to say 
more about what is meant by governance and the characteristics of 
organizational governance arrangements in the private and public sectors. 
The reason for doing this is to explore whether and how governance practices 
in private and public sectors are influencing those of hybrid organisations. 
Governance in the private and public sectors 
The term governance has become an important concept in a variety of 
different disciplinary and practice arenas including management, economics, 
public administration, public policy and politics. It has its roots in a Latin word 
meaning to steer or give direction. However, as Kooiman (1999) notes in a 
useful review article the term is used in a number of different ways, which can 
lead to confusion. He suggests one useful way of distinguishing between 
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different usages is in terms of levels of analysis. The focus here is on the 
organizational level and how organizations are governed.  The term corporate 
or organizational governance is often used to refer to governance at this level, 
and can be defined as the structures, systems and processes concerned with 
ensuring the overall direction, control and accountability of an organization 
(Cornforth, 2004). The body with the main responsibility in an organization for 
carrying out governance functions is the organization’s board or governing 
body. However, the corporate governance system is wider than this and 
includes the framework of broader responsibilities and accountabilities within 
which organizations operate, including regulatory and reporting requirements 
and relations with key stakeholders. 
 
It is important to distinguish organizational governance from political 
governance, at a higher level of analysis, where it is used to refer to new 
patterns of government and governing. In particular the shift away from a 
unitary state to a more fragmented and arms-length system of government 
where a range of non-governmental bodies participate in the delivery of public 
services and policy formulation (Rhodes, 1994). Of course these new patterns 
of political governance and public service delivery are an important part of the 
context in which many TSOs operate. Indeed one of the main themes of this 
book is whether the growing dependence of many TSOs on the state in terms 
of funding, and the tightly-specified performance requirements that often go 
with this, are undermining their missions and independence. 
 
The language used to refer to an organization’s governing body and those 
that serve on it varies widely between and within the different sectors. In this 
chapter, for the sake of simplicity, the term board will be used to refer to the 
governing body, and board member for those elected or appointed to the 
board. There are also other important differences between governance 
arrangements in the private, public sectors and third sectors. However, there 
has been a growing trend for governance practices in one sector to influence 
those in another sector, another sign of hybridity. For this reason corporate 
governance arrangements in the private and public sectors are examined 
briefly below before looking in more detail at the third sector. 
The private sector 
In the private sector modern systems of corporate governance evolved with 
the increasing separation of ownership from control in companies (Learmount, 
2002:7-8). As shareholders became separated from those that managed 
companies they appointed boards to act on their behalf. In addition, systems 
of reporting, regulation, accounting and audit were developed to try to ensure 
corporations were run in their owners’ interest and subject to constraints of 
the law. In the UK public companies have ‘unitary’ boards consisting of 
executives and independent or non-executive directors (NEDs) elected by 
shareholders, who are responsible for running the company and safeguarding 
shareholders’ interests. The voting rights of shareholders are in proportion to 
the number of shares they hold, so large shareholders are able to exert more 
influence than small shareholders. 
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The requirements on quoted public companies that are able to sell their 
shares to the public are more demanding than for private companies and 
many of the recent corporate governance reforms in UK have been aimed at 
them. Prompted by concern over governance ‘failures’ in a number of large 
corporations these reforms started in earnest with the report of the Cadbury 
Committee in 1992 (Cadbury, 1992) and have been developed further into a 
combined code of good practice in a series of subsequent reports. The main 
thrust of the code has been concerned with strengthening the position of 
NEDs, so they are better able to hold executives to account. Important 
recommendations include separating the Chair and Chief Executive roles, 
ensuring that a majority of board members are NEDs and that audit and 
remuneration sub-committees are established consisting of NEDs. The code 
is not mandatory on listed companies, but if they deviate from the code they 
have to explain why. However, critics of this system suggest that boards too 
often become self-perpetuating elites dominated by executives and that the 
majority of shareholders are too passive to hold boards effectively to account 
(Monks, 2005).  
The public sector 
There are some parallels with the private sector in the development of 
governance arrangements in the governmental or public sector. As public 
institutions developed it became necessary to put in place people who could 
oversee and control these institutions on behalf of the public. In a democracy 
these ‘governors’ are elected through a public vote of eligible citizens and are 
expected to be publicly accountable. The elected ‘governors’ are expected to 
decide policy which is then carried out by public officials.  
 
However, in practice governance arrangements across the public sector are 
much more varied. Public services may be delivered by central government 
departments, by local authorities, by arms length agencies or through 
contracts with private and third sector providers (Europe Aid, 2009). Since the 
1980’s central government has reformed the way many public services are 
delivered and governed. There has been an increase in the formation of 
public bodies that operate at arms length from government with their own 
boards and a move away from elected to appointed board members, or some 
combination of elected and appointed posts. In 2003 Steele and Parston 
(2003: 5) estimated that just under a third of the governors of public bodies in 
areas such as health, police authorities, schools and housing associations 
were appointed. These reforms also reflect a degree of hybridisation. Many of 
these governance reforms were modelled at least in part on private sector 
practices and the language of corporate governance has become 
commonplace in many parts of the public sector. More recently some changes 
have been influenced by practices from the third sector. For example, the new 
NHS Foundation Trusts are modelled in part on mutual and co-operative 
traditions found in the third sector, with local members of the community and 
staff electing the majority of members on a board of governors, who then 
appoint the NEDs onto the board of directors (Ham and Hunt, 2008). 
 
One important difference between organizations in the public sector and those 
in the private sector is that the former are not usually fully independent, but 
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are subject to a degree of political direction and control from government. 
Hence, the governing bodies of public service organizations are often 
constrained in their ability to set policy and strategy for the organization, for 
example by central government funding decisions and priorities. This can lead 
to tension between local and central accountability. There are also 
considerable differences in governance arrangements between public bodies 
in different fields. So for example a private sector model for boards of 
directors was adopted in health, with executive and non-executive directors 
on the board, whereas in schools a multi-stakeholder model prevailed, usually 
involving elected parent governors, local education authority appointees, staff 
governors and co-opted governors. Although it is now more common for 
executives to have a place on governing bodies of public organizations they 
are usually very much in the minority on the board. 
Governance in the third sector 
In chapter 2, David Billis argued that the ideal typical TSO is the membership 
association run by its members and volunteers, reliant primarily for resources 
on membership fees and voluntary donations of time and money, and where 
the governing body is elected by the membership in ‘private’ elections. TSOs 
are set up to serve a social mission, rather than being profit seeking or 
serving a statutory purpose, and it is the duty of the board to safeguard this 
mission. 
 
There are a number of distinctive characteristics of organizational governance 
in ‘pure’ membership associations. Firstly, there is a two-tier power structure 
where a small group of people who are responsible for overseeing how the 
organization is run (sometimes called the board of trustees, board of directors, 
governing body or management committee) are accountable to a larger group 
of members. Board members are elected by this wider membership in ‘private’ 
elections on the basis of one person one vote. Secondly, board membership 
is voluntary i.e. it is unpaid. Thirdly, unlike boards in the private sector, and 
some public sector organizations, board membership does not usually include 
paid executives of the organization, although board members may be people 
who work as volunteers in the organization.  
 
However, it is important to note that there are considerable variations in the 
governance arrangements of TSOs, and many vary from this model of a pure 
membership association. These different governance structures are examined 
in detail in the next section. There are also other important variations 
concerning who are the beneficiaries of TSOs that have implications for 
governance. It is useful to distinguish between those organizations set up to 
benefit the wider community or public, and those set up primarily to benefit 
their members, such as many co-operatives and mutual societies. As mutual 
and co-operative societies are primarily trading organizations, they are 
perhaps better regarded as third/private sector hybrids. For reasons of space 
they will not be considered in this chapter, (although it should be noted that 
they face many similar governance challenges to other membership 
associations). 
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It is also important to recognise that governance arrangements and practices 
can change over time. In another important sign of growing hybridity there has 
been considerable debate in the voluntary sector about whether private sector 
practices, such as the payment of board members and allowing executives to 
serve on boards, should be adopted. Advocates have seen these practices as 
a way of improving the quality and commitment of board members, while 
detractors have argued they would undermine some of the key principles of 
TSOs. While in many parts of the third sector these changes have been 
rejected or resisted in some hybrid organizations, such as housing 
associations, they have become common place. 
Three models of third sector governance 
This section examines some of the main governance structures adopted by 
TSOs. While the membership association is an important ideal type for TSOs 
it is argued that in practice there are considerable variations in governance 
structures and three main types are identified. The following section then goes 
on to consider how the development of a staff hierarchy, typical of what Billis 
(chapter 2) calls ‘entrenched’ hybrids, impinges on governance processes and 
membership control. 
 
At the level of the ‘unitary’ organization (i.e. an organization without 
subsidiaries) there are three main types of governance structures employed 
by TSOs: the ‘pure’ membership association, the self-selecting board and the 
mixed type, which combines feature of the two previous types. 
 
As noted above, in a membership association there is essentially a two tier 
structure at the organizational level: the membership, which may consist of 
individuals or organizations (and is wider than the board), and a board, which 
is democratically elected by the members1. The board is responsible for 
overseeing the day-to-day running of the organization and is expected to 
account to the membership at annual general meetings or extraordinary 
meetings that are called for special purposes. Some voluntary organizations 
may also have people associated with the organization that they call 
members, but do not have voting rights. Indeed there has been a growing 
trend to ‘commoditise’ membership and see it primarily as a source of funding 
and support rather than a mechanism for control and accountability. For our 
purposes organizations that only have non-voting members are not regarded 
as membership associations. 
 
As a governance structure the membership association has various potential 
advantages: it provides a mechanism for keeping the board accountable to 
the wider membership; the membership can act as a potential pool of 
volunteers, donors, campaigners and board members and can provide a 
                                               
1
 In practice the governance structures of many membership associations are more complex than this 
simple model. Some large associations have a nested, hierarchical governance structures with branches, 
local associations, affiliates or regions which may have their own elected boards as well as an 
overarching board at the level of the organization as a whole. Some organizations may have a federal 
structure where individual organizations are largely autonomous, but come together to form a 
federation. There may also be different categories of membership with different rights and 
responsibilities. For a review of research on the topic see Tschirhart (2006). 
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source of feedback to the board on the needs of beneficiaries or users. 
However, it can also lead to potential governance problems.  Research by the 
Charity Commission (2004: 9-11) suggests that there is more scope for 
governance disputes in membership associations, for example: if membership 
records are not kept up to date and so it is unclear who are voting members, 
member relations are not managed effectively, the membership lacks diversity 
or is dominated by particular interest groups.  
 
In some organizations the membership is restricted to board members; hence 
the governance structure is effectively reduced to a single tier with a self-
selecting board. This has the advantage of being a very simple structure to 
operate. It gives the board greater control over who is selected to serve on it 
with the potential that board members can be chosen for their experience and 
skills. This process may also help to reduce conflicts of interest between 
competing membership groups. However, it has a number of potential 
disadvantages: there is a danger the board may become self-serving or 
subject to group-think; there is a potentially important loss of accountability as 
the board is no longer formally accountable to a wider constituency, although 
regulatory controls may provide some reassurances the board is acting in the 
interest of its intended beneficiaries, and it may deprive the organization of a 
potential source of support and resources. As David Billis notes in chapter 2 
the commitment of staff and volunteers to the values of an organization may 
‘compensate’ for the absence of a active membership by placing demands for 
accountability on the board and helping to maintain the organisation’s mission 
and values. 
 
The third type of governance structure, the mixed type, contains a mixture of 
the features of the previous two types. There is a wider membership, but the 
membership only elects a proportion of board members and the others posts 
are appointed, for example people may be co-opted to the board to fill skills 
gaps or nominated by particular ‘stakeholder’ organizations. This mixed type 
of governance structure has the potential to harness the advantages of both 
the two previous types of governance structure, ensuring a degree of 
democratic accountability to members and harnessing member support, but 
still allowing the board to recruit some members to ensure it has the 
necessary skills and experience. However, there are also potential 
disadvantages: the role of elected members can be marginalised if other 
board members are perceived to have greater expertise; involving board 
members from external stakeholder groups, such as funders, can lead to 
conflicts of interest and uncertainty over whether board members are acting in 
the best interests of the organization or the stakeholder group that they come 
from, and it may be more difficult to reach agreement on decisions in multi-
stakeholder boards where a diverse range of stakeholder interests are 
involved. 
 
It is important to remember though that in practice the differences between 
governance structures that involve a wider membership and those where the 
board is self-selecting may not be quite as clear as at first appears. Over time 
membership may decline or become inactive and in some organizations 
boards may control who is nominated for election. As a result boards may still 
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exercise a considerable degree of influence over who becomes a board 
member. Michels (1949) formulated the tendency of democratic associations 
to become dominated by elites as his ‘iron law of oligarchy’. While many 
studies have confirmed the widespread nature of oligarchic tendencies the 
inevitability of these processes has been challenged, and various factors have 
been identified that can help to safeguard member involvement and 
democracy (Knoke, 1990: 12-16 and 143-161; Cornforth, 1995). 
 
It is difficult to obtain accurate figures on the frequency of these different 
governance structures in the third sector. However, the Charity Commission 
(2004) estimated that about 80,000 charities, or roughly half those on in its 
register, have voting members, (and a further 20% of charities have non-
voting members). This suggests that pure membership associations and 
those with mixed structures make up about half of all registered charities, and 
so presumably those with self-selecting boards also make up about half. Of 
course these figures exclude the very many voluntary and community groups 
that are not registered as charities; by and large these are likely to be small 
organizations without paid staff, such as residents or sports associations, and 
are more likely to be membership associations.   
Governance in organizations with and without staff hierarchies 
In chapter 2 David Billis distinguished between associations that are run 
mainly by their members and employ relatively few or no paid staff, and 
voluntary agencies (entrenched hybrids) that employ a larger number of paid 
staff and are managed by a professional managerial hierarchy. These 
differences have important implications for the practice of governance. Much 
of the research on the governance of voluntary and non-profit organizations 
has focussed on these larger voluntary agencies. A great deal of this research 
has been undertaken in the US and focuses on the role of boards in non-profit 
organizations providing human services. Important topics for research have 
been: governance functions and board roles, the determinants and 
consequences of board composition, the relationships between boards and 
management, and the determinants and consequences of board effectiveness 
(Ostrower and Stone, 2006). As Rochester (2003) notes there has been a 
high degree of consensus on the different governance functions and board 
roles and how they are distinct from those of management or other paid staff. 
 
However, in TSOs with few or no staff the boundaries between governance, 
management and the ordinary work of the organization are much more 
blurred as there are few or no managers or staff for board members to 
delegate work to. As a result board members are likely not only to get 
involved in governance but management and operational matters as well. It is 
no accident that the governing bodies of these organizations are often called 
management committees rather than boards or governing bodies. 
 
Once TSOs start to employ staff a new dynamic occurs (Wood, 1992). Case 
study research by Cornforth and Edwards (1998: 38-9) suggests that the 
transition to employing a paid staff hierarchy can lead to tensions and conflicts 
between boards and management as they struggle over redefining their 
respective roles and responsibilities. Rochester (2003), based on a study of 
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small voluntary agencies employing less than five staff, suggests these 
organizations face three distinctive problems with respect to governance 
compared to larger organizations with an established paid staff. First, they 
experience greater problems in recruiting and retaining board members, and 
those they do recruit are more likely to lack relevant experience and expertise. 
This finding is supported by results from a survey of charities in England and 
Wales which showed that difficulties in recruiting board members were 
inversely related to organizational size (Cornforth and Simpson, 2002). 
Second, the ability of these boards to carry out the commonly ascribed 
governance functions was limited. For example, Rochester observed that the 
boards were only involved fitfully in determining policies and that this was 
often done reactively in response to particular problems as the emerged. 
Third, senior staff found it difficult to find the time to properly service, support, 
and help develop the boards of their organizations. He suggests these 
problems are not unique to small voluntary agencies but that they are felt in a 
particularly acute form.  
 
Drawing on the work of Billis (1993) Rochester characterises these small 
voluntary agencies as hybrids combining elements of the pure membership 
association with that of a bureaucracy. While not disagreeing with this 
analysis a question remains whether by itself employing a paid staff hierarchy 
should be regarded as a sign of ‘entrenched’ hybridity, in the sense of 
adopting private or public sector practices? While paid staff are more common 
in the public and private sectors they also occur commonly in the third sector, 
and conversely it is not unusual for some public organizations to use 
volunteers. The motivation to employ paid staff in the third sector appears 
often to be one of needing to scale up and coordinate activities or draw on 
professional expertise, rather than an adoption of private or public sector 
approaches, so the degree to which this is an indicator of hybridity is open to 
question. However, it is true that maintaining a staff structure can lead to 
greater pressures on voluntary organizations to seek government funding or 
grow commercial activities which can lead to greater hybridisation, but this is 
not inevitable. This is an issue that is taken up next as we examine the growth 
of trading activities in charities and the implications for governance. 
The case of trading charities 
Over more than a decade there has been a growing trend for voluntary 
organizations to earn more of their income from trading activities. The UK 
Voluntary Sector Almanac in 2006 reporting on data from 2003/4 concluded 
that ‘social enterprise activities are driving the sector’s economy’ (Wilding et 
al, 2006). Income from trading activities was estimated to increase from 33% 
in 1994/5 to 47% of total income in 2003/4 surpassing voluntary income from 
donations and grants at 45% of total income. As a proportion of total income 
the public sector provided 38%, which was a small increase from 2001/2, 
compared to 35% of income from individuals. The growth in earned income 
also reflected a shift in public sector funding from grants to contracts, with 
53% of public sector income into the sector coming from fees. This suggests 
that at the time about 25% of total income was coming from public sector 
contracts. At the same time income generation was concentrated in the larger 
charities with 2% of charities (numbering approximately 3200) generating 66% 
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of the total income. In 2005/6 the earned income of general charities rose to 
over 50% for the first time (Reichart et al., 2008). 
 
This growth in commercial activity among charities raises important questions. 
Is trading leading to hybrid forms of organization and new governance 
structures? What challenges does this raise for charity trustees and how are 
the managing them? In order to consider these questions it is important to 
examine first the different types of trading that charities may engage in and 
the legal requirements that exist to safeguard a charity’s assets and mission. 
 
Trading activities by charities may be divided into three types: primary 
purpose trading, which directly furthers the charity’s objects or mission, like St 
Mungo’s carrying out government contracts for the homeless; ancillary 
trading, which is indirectly related to the charity’s mission, for example a café 
in a charitable museum; or non-primary purpose trading, which is not related 
the charity’s mission but designed purely to raise funds, such as many charity 
shops (Alter, 2006). These distinctions are important because legally charities 
can only carry out primary trading within the charity itself, apart from small-
scale exemptions for ancillary and non-primary purpose trading. If a charity 
wants to engage in significant trading that does not directly further its 
charitable objects it is required by law to establish a trading subsidiary. 
Charities may also decide to set up trading subsidiaries as a way of protecting 
their charitable assets from commercial risks and for tax reasons (Sladden, 
2008).  
 
Interestingly a number of social enterprises that were established to trade in 
the market have ‘moved in the opposite direction’ towards the voluntary and 
community sector by establishing charitable subsidiaries where they have 
social goals that qualify as charitable. This has the advantage again of helping 
to protect their social mission and means that their charitable activities are 
better able to attract grants and tax relief (Social Enterprise Coalition, 
2007:15)).  
Subsidiaries and governance 
One of the main ways then for a charity to manage the risks from trading 
activities is to separate out or ‘decouple’ trading from its other operations and 
manage it within a commercial subsidiary. Trading charities can be regarded 
as third/private sector hybrids, as the charity owns the subsidiary, with the 
charity fulfilling the social or charitable mission and the subsidiary being run 
as a commercial business to generate funds for the charity. This has 
important implications for how the organization is governed; leading to more 
complex, hybrid governance structures than in a unitary organization, as each 
subsidiary will need to have its own board as well as the charity as a whole. 
 
This can lead to new challenges for trustees as Sladden (2008) notes: 
‘Charity trustees have a fair understanding of their responsibilities but 
may struggle with a full understanding of how trading subsidiaries fit 
into the governance picture. The problem lies in the fact that trading 
companies are established to generate a profit whereas charities are 
set up to serve the needs of beneficiaries.’ 
 11
 
An important governance challenge is that trustees of the charity and the 
directors of any trading subsidiary have separate and distinct responsibilities. 
Hence a trustee that becomes a director of the subsidiary needs to be aware 
of these separate duties. This can of course lead to conflicts of interest. In 
order to mitigate these the Charity Commission (2006) recommends that the 
board of any subsidiary should contain at least one director who is not a 
trustee or employee of the charity, and the charity should have at least one 
trustee who is not a director of the subsidiary. There also needs to be a 
complete separation of assets and resources, so if a subsidiary uses any of 
the charity’s assets or resources it should be on a clear commercial and 
contractual basis. When establishing a subsidiary trustees need to treat it as 
any other investment and consider whether the investment is justified and in 
the best interests of the charity, and set up arrangements for monitoring the 
subsidiary to evaluate it success, with contingency plans should it not 
succeed. 
 
Of course these legal safeguards can not eliminate all problems and there can 
still be tensions been the social and business goals of the charity. Exploratory 
interviews with board members, staff and advisers of trading charities by 
Spear et al (2007: 34-41) revealed a number of perceived problems. For 
example in one children’s charity there were regular discussions about putting 
fees for services up because of concerns about reserves. However, the 
charitable side of the organization resisted these proposals because of the 
likely negative impact on some of the charity’s main beneficiaries. Another 
potential problem is that trustees may not be familiar with commercial 
operations and be ill-equipped to evaluate business propositions and risks. 
Some interviewees commented that their trustees were too risk averse or had 
established procedures and governance structures that were too cumbersome 
for commercial operations. There can also be problems recruiting directors 
with the necessary business skills. Again this problem is often felt most 
acutely in smaller organizations. 
Public sector spin-offs 
As well as TSOs ‘moving closer’ to the public sector through being contracted 
to provide public services, there are hybrid organizations being formed in a 
transition in ‘the opposite direction’ from the public sector towards the third 
sector. That is when services that were once provided by public authorities 
are transferred or ‘spun-out’ into independent charities or social enterprises. 
Common examples include housing associations formed by the transfer of 
council housing stock, leisure trusts (LTs) that have taken over the recreation 
and leisure services previously provided by local authorities, and social 
enterprises formed to take over some social and health care services. Indeed 
the Department of Health has been actively promoting the establishment of 
social enterprises as a way of encouraging innovation in the health sector and 
bringing services closer to patients and the community (Walsham et al, 2007). 
The governance challenges of these new organizations are still emerging as 
these health quasi-markets are being constructed, with varying practices of 
service commissioners, and considerable variety in the configurations of 
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provision: including single organizations, partnerships, consortia, and looser 
networks.   
 
As a result there is very little research on the governance structures and 
challenges faced by these particular hybrid organizations. However, Spear et 
al (2007: 51-54) carried out some exploratory interviews with people involved 
in public sector spin-offs which revealed a number of different governance 
challenges associated with multi-stakeholder boards and the culture change 
necessary in order to enable boards and staff to face market challenges and 
move away from bureaucratic processes and structures common in the public 
sector.   
 
Many public sector spin-offs have multi-stakeholder boards embodying a 
variety of sectional interests, often including staff, users, and trade union and 
local authority nominated members. As one interviewee in a LT noted this can 
lead to ‘delegate syndrome’, where board members act as if they are 
delegates for the particular stakeholder group they come from rather than act 
as a team in the best interests of the organization as a whole. 
 
In some cases staff members are the largest group on the board. The need to 
gain staff and trade union commitment to any transfer out of the public sector 
may be an important reason for their representation on boards.  As another 
interviewee commented this can lead to a particular type of delegate 
syndrome where staff initially get involved to protect their own interests: 
‘When we transferred from being council employees … the people 
(staff) that put their names forward (for the board) were the ones that 
were cynical, suspicious of the organization. One of them was making 
sure that their rights were being protected so they’re actually going in it 
for the wrong reasons, so they’re not putting the best interests of the 
company forward but I was quite happy with that because it’s better to 
have them on the inside rather than causing problems on the outside. 
Within a year they realised that there was no hidden agenda and that 
this was about doing things much, much better.’ 
 
In health services the picture is often more complex where some categories of 
staff can be particularly powerful, like clinicians, who can be sensitive about 
the involvement of other groups on the board.  Negotiating a balance between 
the clinical governance concerns and enterprise governance has been a 
perennial challenge. One interviewee noted ‘clinical people don’t think in a 
business way…marketing is on another planet’. There may also be problems 
in small health social enterprises of having access to the necessary expertise 
to manage clinical risks. 
 
Tensions may also occur with other stakeholders such as users. Developing a 
range of mechanisms to involve users at board and other levels is often 
specified as a priority in public service delivery, but can be difficult to achieve 
effectively.  Users may find it difficult to move beyond representing narrow 
sectional interests or feel they do not have the expertise and skills to 
effectively influence many board decisions, particularly with respect to 
commercial or financial matters.   
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The research also revealed contrasting views on the value of having someone 
from the main funding body on the board, for example local councillors on the 
boards of Leisure Trusts.  On the one hand some interviewees pointed to 
difficulties with councillors wearing their local government hat and being 
unable to fully appreciate the different interests of the trust.  However, other 
interviewees felt that having a local authority nominee on the board can be an 
advantage:  
‘… it works much better when you’ve actually got somebody who is 
interested in leisure and running leisure from a political point of view in 
a district that is also one of our stakeholders because you get to know 
exactly the priorities of the council and in which direction they are 
going…’ 
 
Some LTs have grown and operate in a number of localities so that they are 
no longer so dependent on their ‘parent’ local authority, but others still operate 
only in one locality. This dependence can create tensions that may threaten 
the sustainability of LTs. As one interviewee noted: 
‘…some local authorities are now wanting a cut of the surplus … or 
they threaten to cut the grant the next year – this is not good for 
investment and future planning … in some cases these grants are on a 
one year basis and decisions are made very late… the impact on 
governance is massive.’ 
Ensuring the independence and sustainability for relatively small social 
enterprises in public sector markets continues to be a key challenge both for 
board members and management. 
Conclusions 
The growth of trading activities by TSOs, often stimulated by the contracting 
out of public services, and the growing involvement of TSOs in partnerships 
with organizations in the public and private sectors has lead to more complex 
governance arrangements at both inter-organizational and organizational 
levels. To date research on the governance of TSOs has focussed primarily 
on the boards of unitary organizations and has not kept pace with this growing 
complexity and the emergence of hybrid forms of organization. 
  
In addressing the considerable complexity of governance arrangements in the 
third sector and the impact of hybridity, this chapter has attempted to clarify 
the main governance structures used by TSOs and how they differ from 
governance structures in the public and private sectors. Three main types of 
governance structure were identified for unitary organizations: the pure 
membership association, where the board is elected by and accountable to 
the membership; the self-selecting board, where the membership and board 
are the same, and the mixed type, where some board members are elected 
by the membership and others are selected or nominated by stakeholders. It 
also examined some the of the distinctive governance challenges of TSOs as 
they move from being entirely voluntary associations to taking on paid staff, 
including the potential for conflict in differentiating board and staff roles, the 
difficulty of recruiting and retaining suitable board members and staff not 
having the time to adequately service the board. 
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At the organizational level an important strategy for dealing with hybridity is to 
decouple trading activities from those related to the organization’s social 
mission through the creation of subsidiaries. This has lead organizations to 
adopt more complex, multi-level governance structures, with main and 
subsidiary boards. For many charities that wish to engage in secondary 
trading the law requires them to set up trading subsidiaries in order to protect 
their charitable status and assets. Interestingly some social enterprises, 
established as businesses, have subsequently set up charities separate from 
their trading activities to further their social missions and to improve their tax 
efficiency and eligibility to seek grant funding. However, little is known about 
how these more complex governance arrangements work in practice. This 
raises a range of important questions that deserve more in-depth research. 
How do main and subsidiary boards divide up their responsibilities and 
manage relationships between themselves? How are board members 
‘recruited’ to the different boards and how do their different backgrounds and 
identities affect the way they interpret and perform their roles? How are 
differences and conflicts between subsidiary and main boards, and between 
social and commercial goals managed? 
 
Hybrid organizations have different origins or roots (see Billis chapter 2) and 
have to make different transitions. Some hybrids are formed when charities 
undertake trading activities to raise funds and others may be spun out of the 
public sector. While others may be started from scratch as social enterprises 
by social entrepreneurs. These different transitions can raise particular 
challenges for organizations and their boards. Public sector spin-offs, such as 
Leisure Trusts, often have to deal with staff and trade union fears that the 
change will impact adversely on terms and conditions of employment, and 
their dependence on one key funder that may also be represented on the 
board. Charities that wish to engage in secondary trading to raise funds need 
to find a way of protecting their charitable assets and managing the risks 
associated with trading. Social enterprises started from scratch have to face 
all the challenges of establishing any new business, while at the same time 
furthering their social mission, and establishing the legitimacy of what is still a 
relatively poorly understood form of business. This suggests that many of the 
important challenges that face hybrid organizations and their boards are 
shaped by their different origins, the legal structures they adopt, the different 
regulatory requirements they face and the paths they take as they develop. It 
also highlights the fact that hybridity is not a fixed characteristic of 
organizations, but evolves over time in response to changing pressures and 
demands. Another important direction for further research is to examine in 
more depth what drives organizations to adopt characteristics from other 
sectors and how the different origins and paths hybrids take influence the 
governance structures they adopt and the challenges they face.  
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